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FOREWORD 
IIASA's concern for the management and decision problems associated with high-
risk situations has a number of roots. One was ajoint project on risks associated 
with nuclear energy involving IIASA's Energy Program and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. Another examined the institutional aspects of two oil-
well blowouts in the North Sea. From these interests has grown a study of the 
management problems of hazard and risk in a variety of different situations. 
This report, which was developed from work done by Joanne Linnerooth 
as part of the joint IAEA/IIASA project, considers the value of human life, an 
issue as important for current work at IIASA as studies that have been done in 
the past. Thus, it deals with a necessary element in a comprehensive approach 
involving technology, economics, decision analysis, and social science to the 
full range of managerial and institutional problems associated with establishing 
and operating hazardous industrial activities. 
ROLFE TOMLINSON 
Chairman 
Management and Technology Area 
iii 

THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE: 
A REVIEW OF THE MODELS 
JOANNE LINNEROOTH* 
This paper reviews four consumer maximization models 
where the probability of premature death enters as a variable 
that is both known to the consumer and under his control. 
These models generate a number of interesting results with 
respect to a person's willingness to pay for an increased chance 
of living. The most useful to the cost-benefit analyst is the 
derived relationship between this willingness-to-pay value and 
a person's lifetime earnings, and thus the relationship between 
the theoretically correct willingness-to-pay approach to the 
valuation of life-saving programs and the widely-used human-
capital approach. However, the conclusions of the reviewed 
models are in this regard conflicting. Two of the models estab-
lish a theoretical basis for investigating the correlation of these 
two measures; however, this basis is shown to follow from an 
unrealistic assumption concerning the person's lifetime utility 
function. The remaining two models, although based upon 
more realistic assumptions, do not claim to provide theoretical 
grounds for making such investigations. The conclusion of this 
review is that in the absence of available data on personal 
demand for increased survival probability it is impossible to 
determine the relationship between the willingness-to-pay and 
the human-capital approaches to placing a value on human life. 
One of the most difficult problems facing the cost-benefit analyst is 
the evaluation of public policies or investments which could result in the 
loss or saving of human life. A widely accepted procedure for "pricing" 
an expected change in population mortality is to estimate the expected 
loss in earned income; here the value of a person's life is calculated as 
his discounted expected future earnings. This human-capital approach I 
*International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; Joint International Atomic Energy 
Agency/International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Research Project, Vienna, Austria. 
I wish to acknowledge the valuable advice and criticism received from Jack Hirshleifer , who devoted 
considerable time to earlier drafts of this paper. Martin Bailey, Lester Lave , M. Jones-Lee, Martin 
McGuire and Dan Usher also provided many helpful comments. The responsibility for any remaining 
errors is solely mine. 
I. The human-capital approach has a long history: Its original intent was to estimate optimal 
life insurance (e .g., Woods and Metzger, 192 7; Dublin and Lotka, 1940); later it served as a measure 
of the economical losses from accident or disease (e.g., Fisher, 1909; Reynolds, 1956; Weisbrod, 
1965); and more recently it has been adopted as a measure of benefits from life-saving programs 
(e.g., Fromm, 1965; Lave and Seskin, 1970; Otway et al., 1971; White House Office of Science and 
Technology, 1972; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1972). For the last purpose, 
other suggested methods have been derived from jury awards (Thedie and Abraham, 1961) and 
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remains popular despite the criticism that it takes account only of 
society's loss in national income and ignores the person's own desire to 
live.2 
From the point of view of economic welfare criteria 3 a more appro-
priate measure of the benefits arising from a decrease in population 
mortality4 would include the consumer's interest - the desire of each 
person at risk to avoid premature death. But as the number of deaths 
averted by public expenditures is usually known only statistically, that is, 
there are no named individuals who would almost certainly die in the 
absence of the expenditure, the relevant measure need not take into 
account a person's preference for avoiding death, but rather his pref-
erence for avoiding some small probability of death. For this reason 
Mishan ( 1971) suggests that if alternative allocations are to be compared 
by their potential for a Pareto improvement, then these preferences 
should be expressed in terms of the willingness of each person to pay for 
the (usually) marginal reduction in mortality risk. 5 
The question arises whether the value of a person's life implied by 
his willingness to pay to reduce a small chance of death differs greatly 
from the value calculated by the widely-used human-capital measure. 
Schelling ( 1968), who was the first to address this question, suggests that 
there are no grounds for assuming that the two measures are the same: 
" ... there is no reason to suppose that a man's future earnings, discounted 
in any pertinent fashion, bear any particular relation to what he would 
pay to reduce some likelihood of his own death" (p. 149). 
The empirical evidence on this question is not conclusive. There have 
been several attempts to infer the price of risk-taking from the relation-
ship between risky jobs and their respective wage rates;6 however, there 
are several limitations to this market approach, the most critical being 
the implied assumption that the workers perceive the risks accurately 
and have the necessary mobility to change their occupation. A second 
from insurance decisions on life saving (Morlat , 1970; Starr, 1969). More recent discussions of the 
life-valuation problem from a decision-theoretic point of view can be found in Zeckhauser (1975) 
and Raiffa et al. (1976). For a survey of this literature, see Linnerooth ( 1975, 1976). 
2. For original critiques of this approach, see Thedie and Abraham ( 1961 ), Roesch (1961 ), 
Schelling ( 1968), and Mish an ( 1971 ). 
3. Here we are referring to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of welfare change. 
4. In this paper I will refer generally to the benefits of decreased mortality, or life saving; 
the costs of life risking can be considered symmetrical. 
5. Mish an argues that familial and social interest in reducing a person 's chances of death is 
also an important, and probably unmeasurable, factor. Yet there is some economic justification 
for this exclusion if we assume that this interest is internalized in the individual's demand for 
increased life expectancy, an assumption implicit in most welfare economics. In any case, the 
individual's interest in his own protection is probably the dominant factor. 
6. For example, Thaler and Rosen (1973) found that in their sample the workers value their 
lives at around $200,000. This figure has been revised and up-Oated by Bailey (1976). See also 
Smith (1973) and Rappaport (1974). 
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possibility for estimating willingness to pay is simply to ask people what 
it is worth to them to increase their survival chances. 7 But survey 
approaches have also been criticized on the grounds that people have dif-
ficulty in assessing probabilities and answering hypothetical questions. 8 
A final approach is to generate a person's willingness to pay for an 
improved chance of living by placing a priori restrictions on the form of 
his lifetime utility function. This is the approach taken by Usher ( 1971 ), 
Jones-Lee (1974), Cook and Graham (1975) and Conley (1976). The 
Usher and Conley models offer the most restrictive formulations of the 
lifetime utility function, which, contrary to Schelling's conjecture, result 
in a specific relationship between a person's lifetime earning and his 
willingness to pay to reduce some probability of his own death. This 
relationship provides a basis for deriving quantitative information on 
willingness to pay. Alternatively, the models of Jones-Lee and of Cook 
and Graham, which are based upon less restrictive forms of the lifetime 
utility function, do not result in a formal relationship between the human-
capital and willingness-to-pay approaches to life valuation. From their 
state preference approach, the authors develop interesting results con-
cerning the value of current-period changes in the risk of death; their 
analyses, however, do not provide a basis for deriving quantitative 
information on this value. Since the analyst's interest in these models 
stems mainly from their potential to generate a measure of willingness 
to pay, it is important to assess the merits of the Usher and Conley 
approach versus those of Jones-Lee and of Cook and Graham. 
The purpose of this review is to compare and contrast the formulations 
of these four models, paying particular attention to the plausibility of 
the underlying assumptions. The first section presents a simple model of 
expected utility maximization for the purpose of defining the "value of 
human life" within the context of consumer choice theory. This model, 
where lifetime utility is a function of lifetime consumption, provides the 
background for the discussion of the Usher and Conley models, which 
follows in the second section. The interpretation of Conley's formulation 
by Hirshleifer, et al. (197 4 ), and especially in Appendix 2 by Rappaport, 
clearly shows the implied relationship between the willingness-to-pay 
and the human-capital approaches, and thus forms the basis of the 
discussion in the third section. The next section presents a broader 
interpretation of lifetime utility which illustrates the sensitivity of Usher's 
and Conley's results to their assumed form of the objective function. 
Finally, a discussion of the Jones-Lee model and the Cook and Graham 
model, where lifetime utility is conditional upon the states "life" and 
7. Responses to one questionnaire (Acton, 1973) designed to determine the demand for 
emergency coronary care units indicated that large groups would be willing to pay from $28,000 
to $43,000 for each expected life saved in the community. 
8. See Fromm (1968). 
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"death," is presented, and their results are contrasted with those of the 
Usher and Conley models. 
I. A SIMPLE MODEL 
It is important to clarify what is meant in this paper by the provocative 
term, "value of human life." Since the analyst is concerned not with the 
rescue of named individuals (or, for that matter, with the sentencing of 
named persons to certain death) but with marginal changes in individual 
risk levels, a more appropriate term would be "value of risk reduction." 
Yet any allocative decision that affects individual risk levels does 
implicitly place a priority or a value on human life, and a major purpose 
of the cost-benefit calculus is to make these values explicit. 9 In other 
words, for a small probability of loss of life there is a conceptual value 
of life which, when multiplied by this probability, yields the maximum 
a person would be willing to pay for the stated improvement in his 
survival chances. 
This concept can be illustrated in the usual manner by the tradeoff 
between wealth and survival probability or by the slope of the indif-
ference function in Figure 1. The convexity of this function assures a 
nonunique value of life since the payment for a marginal increase in P 
depends on the level of P. If, for example, the average person is willing 
to pay $200 for a reduction in mortality risk from 1 o-6 to 10-9 , this does 
not mean that he is willing to pay $200 to reduce a mortality risk by l0-3 
when the risk is originally 10-1 , nor that he is willing to pay $200,000 to 
eliminate certain, immediate death. The $200,000 figure is a measure 
of the value of life only in the sense that the analyst can justifiably use it 
as a measure of the benefit from a policy that results in a per-capita 
mortality risk reduction from 1 o-6 to 10-9 over a population numbering 
1,000; here the expectation is the saving of one life. 
Although the nonlinearity of the indifference function illustrated in 
Figure 1 is intuitive, its shape can be verified with a simple model of 
consumer choice, where the consumer has knowledge of and control 
over his survival chances. The problem is to structure an individual's 
preferences over survival and wealth. As explained above, we can think 
of survival as a probabilistic term for an increase in life expectancy; the 
demand for survival would then be willingness to pay for this increase. 
If we consider an individual who commences the current period with 
full information on his expected lifetime, his probability of surviving any 
given period, i.e., his age-specific survival rate, can be denoted as p,, and 
his probability of being alive at the end of any given period, as P,. We 
9. Fried ( 1969) was the first to point out the apparent anomaly that society is prepared to expend 
far greater resources to save the lives of known persons in present peril than to save a statistical life. 
Raiffa (1976), arguing that these tradeoffs should be made much more explicit, calls this practice 
the "murdering of statistical lives ." 
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assume here that p, occurs on the first day of the period, and therefore 
P, = S,p,, where S, is the probability of surviving until year t or S, = 
Pr-1, P1-2, ... , Po. It follows that the demand for an increase in life 
expectancy can be expressed in terms of the demand for an increase in 
any age-specific survival rate, p,. This demand could be expected to 
depend, among other things, upon the individual's current age or 
expected lifetime, his current wealth and income, the number of his 
dependents, and the nature and timing of the probabilistic death. 
We can begin by considering the problem in its simplest form. For 
this purpose we assume that the individual is a "lone bachelor," i.e., he 
has no family or friends who have an interest in his survival. Thus the 
complications of interdependent utilities and any motive on the part of 
the individual to bequeath his wealth are eliminated. We assume further 
that the individual regards his lifetime as fixed if he survives the initial 
period. Whether or not he survives is determined on the first day when 
he faces some probability of dying, denoted 1 - P0 (P0 = p0 ). Because 
the resolution is instantaneous, he suffers no anxiety. In addition, we 
assume that the individual has a certain fixed wealth which he distributes 
throughout his lifetime. There are no opportunities for saving, investing 
or bequeathing, so this wealth can be regarded as lifetime consumption, 
denoted C. (We will use upper-case letters to refer to lifetime variables 
and lower-case letters to refer to variables relevant to shorter periods of 
time, typically one year). 
We will also make the important assumption that the individual 
behaves as an expected utility maximizer. lo If a utility is assigned to each 
10. Different sets of axioms which imply that the individual maximizes expected utility are 
presented in von Neumann and Morgenstern ( 1947); Savage ( 1954); and Luce and Raiffa (1957). 
57 UNNEROOTH: VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE 
year of his life, then he behaves so as to maximize his expected utility or 
his total utility weighted by the probability of his survival. In this way, 
expected years of life enter the individual's lifetime objective function 
indirectly as a weighting factor. He is assumed to make a quantity-quality 
tradeoff by buying increases in his survival probability until he has 
maximized his expected lifetime utility. 
To be consistent with the formulations of Usher, and of Conley, we 
will express the objective function, or expected lifetime utility, as a 
function of lifetime consumption. Since the individual begins the initial 
period with a certain wealth (lifetime consumption), this objective 
function can be written 
(1) E(UL) = P0 U(C), 
where E(UL) represents expected lifetime utility, P0 is the probability of 
surviving the current period, and U(C) is the utility of lifetime con-
sumption. The individual would then be indifferent; that is, he would 
maintain the same expected utility, given changes in consumption and 
survival probability which hold the expression in ( 1) constant. His 
implied marginal rate of substitution between P0 and C can be calculated 
by taking differentials of this expression, given dE (UL) = O; the result is 
(2) ac/aPo = -(U(C))!(Po U'(C)), 
where U' (C) represents marginal lifetime utility with respect to lifetime 
consumption. It follows from the assumed equivalence of lifetime wealth 
and lifetime consumption that (2) specifies the slope of the indifference 
function (see Figure 1 ), thus representing what has been defined here as 
the value of human life. However, note that considerations such as family 
responsibilities, opportunities for wages and savings, and insurance 
options would complicate the model considerably. 
Although there is little pretense of reality, one important property 
of (2) can be expected to be independent of the restrictive assumptions. 
This is the nonlinear relationship between changes in willingness to 
pay for marginal increases in survival probability and the level of this 
probability. As a person's survival chances decrease, his willingness 
to pay increases at an increasing rate; the indifference function (see 
Figure 1) asymptotically approaches, but never intersects, the W-axis. 
As Bergstrom (in Hirshleifer, et al. (1974)) has pointed out, this formula-
tion resolves the paradox that an individual, although he probably places 
an infinite value on his own life, willingly accepts small probabilities of 
death for finite compensation. I I It also leads to the anomaly that the 
I I. There is an interesting difference here between the risking of lives and the saving of lives. 
It can be argued from (2) that it is impossible to compensate a person fully for accepting certain 
and immediate death; yet individuals facing a very high risk of certain death are constrained by 
their budget with respect to the amount they can pay to reduce this risk. 
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cost-benefit analyst following the precept of revealed preferences would 
not recommend that funds be allocated across projects such that the 
expected number of lives saved is maximized. To the contrary, he will 
recommend allocation of relatively more per expected life saved to the 
marginal reduction of the higher-level risk.12 
II. THE MODELS OF USHER AND CONLEY 
The models of Usher and Conley can most easily be reviewed by 
showing how they compare with or differ from the above formulation. 
With this in mind, each model will be discussed in turn. 
(i) Usher's Model 
Usher is concerned with the life-valuation problem from the point of 
view of developing social indicators that reflect an expanded concept of 
national welfare from the usual income or GNP measures. The inclusion 
of one such welfare change, decreased population mortality rates, 
requires some method of valuing or pricing these changes. For this 
purpose, Usher develops a model of life-cycle planning and asks what 
role uncertain mortality plays: what it is worth to the individual in terms 
of foregone consumption to decrease his risk of dying in any given 
(present or future) period? 
Expected lifetime utility in Usher's formulation is a function of all 
past consumption and can be written 
(3) 
where R, is the probability of living exactly t years, n is the maximum 
length of life, and U,(C) is a function of consumption in each year in 
which the individual is alive, or 
(4) 
Since 
(5) R, = (1 - p,)S,, 
where (I - p,) is the mortality rate in year t and S, is the probability of 
surviving until year t, expected lifetime utility becomes 
(6) 
12. This principle violates what Fried (1969) originally referred to as the economist"s maximizing 
strategy, which states that the same value should be assigned to the expectation of saving (losing) 
a life regardless of the level of risk. A reconciliation of this maximizing strategy with the willingness-
to-pay approach is attempted in Linnerooth ( 1977). 
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For purposes of comparison we can assume that lifetime utility over t 
years is an additive function of utility in each year, or 
(7) 
from which it follows that (6) can be rewritten as 
(8) 
t-1 
where S, = n pj. From (8) it is possible to specify the marginal rate of 
i=O 
substitution between consumption and survival probability for any given 
period of the person's life . For instance, if it is assumed that he purchases 
an increase in survival probability from present consumption, this 
tradeoff can be written 
Considering only initial-period survival probability to conform to our 
simple model, we can write the above as 
The numerator in (9) expresses a person 's expected lifetime utility 
in event that he survives the hazard of the initial period; this can be 
compared to the numerator of (2) which expresses certain lifetime utility, 
again if he survives the initial hazard. The important point is that here 
the value of life is directly related to lifetime utility of (expected) lifetime 
consumption. 
(ii) Conley's Model 
Usher 's analysis describes the shape of the indifference function , or 
the tradeoff between immediate consumption (wealth) and survival 
probability that would leave the individual in an equivalent position if 
the changes in these variables were imposed upon him. In contrast, 
Conley develops a deterministic model of individual maximization, 
where consumption and survival probability enter as behavioral vari-
ables. Assuming that the individual is fully informed, infinitely sensitive, 
and interacting in competitive markets with zero transaction costs, 
Conley expresses the objective function as 
(10) E(UL) = l:, A.(t)u(·)p(-), 
where expected lifetime utility E (UL) is separable into discounted, single-
period utilities, u ( ·) is a single-period function, p ( ·) is the probability 
of being alive, and A.(t) is the utility discount function. 
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Since the purpose here is to establish the relationship between con-
sumption and p(·), we will note only that both u(·) and p(') are functions 
of all lifetime activities, including consumption. Thus, the single-period 
utility function becomes 
(11) u(·) = u(x 1', x2', ••• , x"') = u(X') 
for n activities, denoted x, in period t, and where X' is the vector of 
activities. Conley defines consumption as an activity for which the indi-
vidual must expend cash outlays, and production as an activity which 
results in cash income. When there is no activity, i.e., xi• = 0 for all i's, 
the individual is no longer alive. The utility of the state "death" can be 
arbitrarily set at zero, or 
(12) u(O,O, ... ,0) = 0, 
and u (') is therefore determinable up to a multiple constant. In addition, 
Conley expresses p ( ·) as a function of X' (along with several other 
important variables such as age, outside influences, etc.), from which it 
follows that the objective function can be rewritten as 
(13) E(UL) = l:, A(t)u(X')p(X'). 
The individual maximizes expected utility subject to a monetary con-
straint requiring that expected lifetime consumption equals expected 
lifetime income plus wealth, or 
where r is the market rate of discount, $it is the monetary value associated 
with each unit of xi• such that $i• > 0 when xi• is a consumption activity 
and $i• < 0 when xi• is a production activity, and Wis wealth . According 
to Conley this constraint is feasible since, given the assumption of full-
information and costless markets, a person could contract with an 
insurance company to turn over all his wealth and future income for 
the receipt of an allowance for consumption expenditures. 
The equilibrium conditions for maximization of (13) subject to (14) 
are such that the marginal utility of activity i must equal the expected 
loss of lifetime utility plus the marginal utility of both the monetary cost 
and the change in expected net labor income. From this equilibrium 
condition Conley derives the value of human life, V (which he defines 
as the individual's own interest in his safety decision) as discounted 
expected lifetime consumption divided by the elasticity of discounted 
lifetime utility with respect to lifetime consumption. This can be written 
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p::: I 
(15) V = -UL/(p(fJUL/fJC)) = -C/((fJUL/fJC)(C/UL)) = Gia, 
where a represents the lifetime consumption elasticity of lifetime utility. 
Conley defines the value of lifesaving that is appropriate for valuing 
the benefits of collective protection as H = V + B, where B is equal to 
net labor income or the surplus of lifetime income over lifetime con-
sumption. This concept, then, includes the economic losses accruing 
to others; however, in this full-information model the economic interests 
of others are internalized into the individual's decision-making process. 
For our purposes, it is important to note that the above expression is 
equivalent to the value of human life derived in (2). 
Ill. THE RESULTS 
An important result of these models is that the value an individual 
places on his own protection can be derived from information about the 
utility of his lifetime consumption. We turn now to examining the impli-
cation which this result has on the relationship between the willingness-
to-pay and the human-capital approaches to the valuation of human life. 
In the foregoing, it has been assumed that an individual is endowed 
with or will accumulate a certain wealth which, in the absence of 
bequests, takes the form of lifetime consumption. Alternatively, expected 
lifetime earnings could replace wealth, and thus lifetime consumption, 
as the relevant argument. It is important to keep this broad definition 
of lifetime consumption in mind when considering the following results. 
Conley, who states at the outset that he is interested in determining 
the "value of human life with reference to an individual's wealth and 
utility function characteristics," concludes that "for income above some 
undetermined but presumably low level, the value of life is greater 
than discounted expected earnings ... " (p. 45). In principle, the Usher 
formulation is in agreement with this result. 
This result can be illustrated by specifying a particular shape of the 
lifetime-consumption utility function. According to Conley, Figure 2 
presents the general case in which a strictly concave utility function with 
UL' > 0 will have three regions. In the first, UL < 0 and thus a < 0. 
In the second, UL > 0 but a > 1, therefore V < C. In the third, which 
may be called the general case, 0 < a < 1 and V > C; that is, for a 
value of expected lifetime consumption above some critical value where 
a = 1, a value which is presumably low, the value of human life exceeds 
expected lifetime consumption and, given no bequest motive, exceeds 
expected lifetime earnings. 
Without any loss in generality the level of consumption at which 
a person can no longer survive can be set at zero so that the lifetime 
utility function passes through the origin. This is the approach taken 
by Rappaport in a report by Hirshleifer, et al. (1974), who assumes, 
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as a special case, that death corresponds to an income of C = 0, or the 
person, when alive, considers death as the equivalent of an income of 
zero. He emphasizes the special case in recognition of the fact that most 
people are not indifferent between dying with zero income and dying 
with a positive income, since in most cases there is a bequest motive. 
Given this assumption, Rappaport proceeds by analyzing the indi-
vidual's response to a risky prospect yielding a P chance of income, C, 
and a Q = 1 - P chance of zero income. Since the utility of zero 
income is zero, the expected utility E (UL) of this prospect can be expressed 
(16) E(UL) = PU(C) + QU(O) = PU(C). 
If the individual has a lifetime consumption of C', then the expected 
loss in utility from the hazardous prospect can be seen in Figure 3 as 
1 .. , representing the difference between U(C') and E(UL). In this figure 
E(UL) is simply P times U(C'). The monetary equivalent (the amount of 
money the individual must be compensated to restore him to his original 
utility position of U(C')), noted le, is derived from the slope of the 
function and can be approximated for very small values of Q as 
Since 1 .. = QU(C'), (17) can be rewritten as 
(18) le = Q[(U(C')!(dUL/dC)]. 
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F1GURE 3 
Rappaport's Interpretation of the Value of Life 
UL 
U(C') h------------:::;...-:rr--- U (Cl 
U[E!C)) l+-----------...~-+-1 
0 C'- lc PC' C' c 
It follows from (18) that since Q is the probability of dying, 
(UL(C'))/(dUL/dC) must represent the value of human life. For very low 
Q's, or p :::: 1, this value is directly comparable to the value of life, 
U(C)!(P(dUL/dC)), which was derived by Usher and Conley. 
The significance of this result is that given an assumption with respect 
to the form of an individual's consumption utility, the value of life can 
be calculated from data on personal consumption. As an illustration, 
Usher calculates this value from Canadian time-series data on net 
national product. Assuming that the utility of consumption takes the form, 
(19) U,(C) = I;:~ C~/(l + r)'. 
Usher is able to estimate values for U,(C) (in aggregate) by postulating 
a range of values for b and r, where lib represents a measure for the 
degree of diminishing marginal utility of consumption and r is a sub-
jective parameter representing the degree of utility time preference. 
By substituting this measure of U, (C) into his derived value of life (see 
Equation (9)) and with data on age-specific mortality rates, Usher is able 
to estimate the value of life (in the aggregate). For example, choosing 
r = 3 per cent and b = 50 per cent, he calculates the average value of life 
in 1961 to be $91,000. The values ranged from $13,331,000 (r = 1 % , 
b = 5%) to $33,000 (r = 5%, b = 100%). 
We can conclude that the value of human life as formulated by Usher 
and Conley is formally similar to and empirically correlated with the 
human-capital measure. Indeed, if Usher's special form of consumption 
ECONOMIC INQUIRY 64 
utility is hypothesized, then the value of life differs from life-time earnings 
only to the extent of diminishing marginal utility of lifetime consumption. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION 
This rather surprising relationship between what an individual is 
willing to pay to reduce some probability of instantaneous death and 
his lifetime consumption follows directly from the assumed objective 
function of the two models. The only variable entering the individual's 
lifetime utility was assumed to be lifetime wealth, which in the absence 
of a bequest motive is equivalent to lifetime consumption. 
If lifetime consumption is interpreted, according to Conley's defini-
tion, as total lifetime activities which incur positive monetary outlays, 
then it appears that this specification of the objective function is a 
somewhat narrow representation of a person's "joy of living." Indeed, 
it focuses only on the more materialistic side of life. Yet, the univariate 
specification of the objective function is central to the arguments of 
Usher and Conley, and for this reason it is important to give it careful 
consideration. 
If a person perceives some level of consumption as being that level 
below which he cannot survive, it is reasonable in the absence of bequests 
to consider the utility of this level of consumption as equivalent to the 
utility of death. 13 Again without any loss in generality the utility of this 
point can be arbitrarily set at zero. The lifetime utility function, UL, and 
the lifetime consumption utility function, U(C), have this one point in 
common. This seems to be the basis for the assumption that the functions 
are exactly equivalent, an assumption which is inherent in the above 
formulation of the risky prospect by Rappaport (see Equation 16). 
However, the condition that UL (C = 0) = U(C = 0) = 0 is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for the result that UL = U(C). In fact, this 
result would not follow if UL were a discontinuous function of C as 
illustrated in Figure 4. Here the assumption that a person views zero 
consumption, or zero wealth, as certain death represents simply a dis-
continuity in the curve, or a rather dramatic drop in one's lifetime utility. 
This interpretation, although certainly oversimplified, seems reasonable. 
Indeed, the original intent of Conley's formulation appears to capture 
the essence of this interpretation. 
It can be recalled that Conley's objective function for period t (see 
Equation ( 13)) is specified as a function of all lifetime activities which 
13. It can be argued, however, that the assumption of zero consumption being equivalent to 
death holds only in the aggregate . Rappaport writes that zero consumption means that the individual 
"would be starving, thirsting, and exposed to the elements, i.e., he would be dead soon anyway" 
(p. 15). But here we are reminded that we are considering lifetime consumption as equivalent to 
lifetime earnings or wealth, and in reality most people do not view a total loss of their wealth , 
i.e., bankruptcy, as certain death. 
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he denotes X'. Unfortunately, Conley then limits X' to consumption 
activities, which require a cash outlay, and production activities, which 
result in cash income. If we postulate a third category of neutral activities 
which require no monetary outlays or which result in no cash income, 
then we can respecify lifetime utility as 
UL = "1:.,A(t)u(Z', Q', C'), 
where Z', Q', and C' denote neutral activities, production activities, 
and consumption activities, respectively. From this interpretation of 
the objective function, it follows that the value of human life derived 
from our simple model (see Equation (2)) can be written 
(20) fJC/fJP = -(UL(Z, Q, C))/(PU~(Z, Q, C)), 
where U~(Z, Q, C) denotes the marginal lifetime utility of lifetime 
consumption. 
We now want to ask what difference this derivation makes to the 
results of the Usher and Conley models . In which direction does it affect 
the relationship between the willingness-to-pay method and the human-
capital method for the evaluation of a loss or savings of a human life? 
To answer this question, we will assume for the sake of simplification 
that the utilities of neutral, production and consumption activities are 
separable and additive, or 
UL = U(C) + U(Z) + U(Q) c > 0 
c = 0. 
Given this assumption, Conley's results (see Figure 2) are reinterpreted 
in Figure 4, which shows an additive transformation of the curve. This 
simple function, of course, is only an expositional device with no pretense 
of reality; yet, it does illustrate the point that as either U(Z) or U(Q) 
increases, a decreases . In other words, the higher an individual values his 
nonmaterial activities, the higher he values his life. 
It remains to compare this derivation graphically with that by 
Rappaport. Figure 5 illustrates both his interpretation of the value of 
human life and our derivation, or reinterpretation, of this value. For 
purposes of comparison we continue to assume that zero consumption 
represents lifetime utility as specified by Usher and Conley; alternatively, 
UL represents the lifetime utility function which we have assumed here 
to be an additive function of neutral, production and consumption 
activities . UL and U(C) are assumed parallel, the vertical distance 
between the two curves being U(Z) plus U(Q) . UL becomes discontinuous 
at C = 0, at which point UL = 0. 
The lower part of Figure 5 is recognizable as Rappaport 's representa-
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tion of Conley's derivation (see Figure 3). It can be easily seen from the 
upper part of Figure 5 that given our alternative interpretation of UL this 
derivation underestimates the value of human life. For example, if 
P = 0.5, then l: represents the loss in expected utility, in this case, 
UL - 0.5 UL, and l; represents the necessary compensation to restore 
the individual to his original level of utility. Depending on the value of 
U(Z) and U(Q), l; > le. from which it follows that the Usher and Conley 
derivations underestimate the value of human life. From this specifica-
tion of lifetime utility, we can conclude that lifetime earnings, which 
are represented here by C, can only be interpreted as a lower bound for 
this value. 
This interpretation, however, depends upon the position of the UL 
function. Although it seems reasonable to assume that for most people 
the utility of living, as represented by UL (Z, Q, C) in Figure 5, is some-
what greater than the utility of consumption, this need not be the case 
for everyone. To the contrary, this curve could lie beneath the present 
position of V(C), in which case the person prefers death to some level 
of consumption above subsistence. This is the line of argument adopted 
by Cook ( 1976), who concludes that discounted earnings can only be 
considered an upper bound for the value of human life. 
The position of the lifetime utility function is, of course, an empirical 
matter. The important point here is that there is no evidence to support 
the notion that it is continuous from the origin. We can conclude that 
the value of human life can in no way be correlated with expected life-
time consumption unless the investigator has, in addition, information 
on the utility of other arguments making up lifetime utility. 14 
V. THE STATE-PREFERENCE APPROACH 
In light of the difficulties involved in disaggregating the lifetime utility 
function to any level which might be useful for empirical investigations, 
it seems reasonable to formulate lifetime utility simply as the utility of 
consumption conditional upon the states of the world "alive" and 
"dead." This is the approach of two models, the first by Jones-Lee and 
the second by Cook and Graham, each of which will be discussed in turn. 
(i) Jones-Lee's Model 15 
Jones-Lee, who introduces the possibility of a bequest motive, assumes 
that an individual enters the period in question with a certain wealth 
and faces two contingencies: Either he survives the period, in which case 
14. Hirshleifer, Bergstrom and Rappaport appear to recognize this limitation. Commenting on 
Usher's specification of lifetime utility, they write: "This function gives no weight to the fact of death 
except as it means loss of potential consumption income ... No one has yet developed a utility 
function that captures the value of living per se" (p. 35). 
15. Bergstrom's model (in Appendix I to the Hirshleifer, Bergstrom, Rappaport paper) is 
essentially the same as and contemporaneous with that of Jones-Lee. 
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he and his dependents will enjoy his wealth, or he does not survive the 
period, in which case his dependents will enjoy their inherited wealth. 
Since total lifetime wealth is no longer allocated exclusively to lifetime 
consumption, the objective function is written as follows: 
(21) 
where UA (W) is the utility of wealth conditional on the state of the world 
"alive" and Uv(W) is the utility of wealth conditional on the state of 
the world "dead." The maximization of E (UL) is straightforward and 
results in the condition which has been defined here as the value of 
human life, or 
where U/ (W) and Uv' (W) are the marginal lifetime utility and the 
marginal lifetime bequest utility with respect to wealth, respectively. 
As might be anticipated, a person's desire to leave a certain amount of 
his wealth to his dependents decreases his willingness to pay for his own 
safety. In the absence of a bequest motive, the above expression is 
identical to the previously derived value of life (see Equation (2)) with 
the important exception that here the term UA (W), representing the utility 
of wealth conditional upon the state of the world "alive," substitutes 
for the term U (C). For purposes of providing a basis for empirical 
investigations , this distinction is crucial. 
(ii) The Cook and Graham Model 
In many respects, Cook and Graham (197 5) present a unique analysis 
of the problem of establishing the value for individual risk reduction or, 
in their words, the value of collective protection. Following Jones-Lee, 
they also adopt the state-preference framework, where there are two 
states of the world, "alive" and "dead ," and where the utility of the state 
"dead" represents a bequest utility . Their approach is especially interest-
ing in that they view human life as one commodity within a general class 
of irreplaceable commodities . An irreplaceable commodity can be 
distinguished from a replaceable commodity by determining whether 
in the owner's view there are equivalent commodities available on the 
market. A person's life can be considered irreplaceable, as can the family 
dog, an ancestor's portrait, and so forth . 
Cook and Graham suggest that the value of protection (decreasing 
the probability of loss) of a commodity is the value of this protection 
when fair transfers of wealth or fair insurance are available. This value 
is defined as the pure protection benefit of a public investment. An 
important conclusion of their analysis is that, contrary to the case of 
the replaceable commodity , the pure protection benefit of an irreplace-
able commodity is greater than the amount of fair insurance the indi-
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vidual would choose to purchase. In assessing the benefit of an increase 
in public protection, the correct value of a commodity is bracketed by 
the amount of money the owner would pay to avoid its loss and the 
amount of money required to fully compensate him for its loss, or in 
Hick's (1959) terminology, it is bracketed by the equivalent variation 
and the compensating variation. 
Their analysis proceeds by specifying two states of the world , A and B, 
with the following properties: 
(23) 
and 
(24) UB(W) = U(W, 0) . 
Here, W represents a composite commodity (wealth) including all goods 
other than the commodity in question, 1 represents the state in which the 
commodity is kept and 0 the state in which it is lost. It is assumed thatl6 
U/' (W) < 0 < U/(W) for i = A, B. 
From the above equations, Cook and Graham suggest two possible 
measures for the value of the good. One measure is the minimum com-
pensation (selling price) that would induce the individual to accept a 
certainty of state 0 in exchange for a certainty of state 1. This compen-
sation C (W) is defined by 
(25) 
provided that such a C(W) exists and C(W) = oo, otherwise. Alternatively, 
the value of a good can be expressed as the maximum amount the 
individual would be willing to pay to exchange a certainty of state 0 
for a certainty of state 1. The ransom R (W) is defined by 
(26) 
provided that such an R (W) exists and R (W) = 0, otherwise. 
The ransom, in turn, is closely related to the amount of insurance an 
individual will purchase at fair odds. Assuming fair transfers of wealth 
between states A and B, the individual's expected wealth can be defined 
16. Note that this assumption, which is also found in the Jones-Lee analysis , contradicts the 
function presented in Section 4 (see Figure 4); however, here it is not assumed that U,. (W = 0) = 
Us(W) . 
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where (I - P) is the probability of loss, W;(i = A, B) is endowed wealth 
in state i, and W; (i = A, B) is the financial claim contingent upon state 
i to be purchased. Expected utility 
(28) 
is maximized subject to (2 7). The solutions WA• and W8 • have the 
following property: 
(29) 
where 
(30) 
The authors show further that an individual will insure himself 
completely against the loss of a replaceable commodity, that is, he is 
indifferent as to what state occurs. In this case, the ransom, R (W), will 
be equal to W8 • - ~ •. Alternatively, the individual will not insure 
himself completely against the loss of an irreplaceable commodity; he 
will prefer state A to state B, and R (WA•) > W8 • - WA•. 
With this information, it is possible to specify the pure protection 
benefit for an increase in an individual's probability of survival, where 
the pure protection benefit is defined as the expected payment made by 
the individual (given fair insurance), which, when coupled with an 
increase in his survival chances, leaves his expected utility unchanged. 
For small changes in survival probability, this definition is represented 
by the slope of the indifference function (see Figure 1) where the possi-
bility of fair insurance is taken into account. Therefore, what Cook and 
Graham more appropriately label as the pure protection benefit is 
equivalent to what has been defined here as the value of human life when 
given the opportunity to purchase fair insurance. 
The slope of this indifference function can be specified in the usual 
manner. Letting state A represent the state "life" and state D (substituting 
D for B), the state "death," Equations (27), (28) and (29) can be rewritten 
W(P) = PWA *(P) + (I - P) W0 *(P), 
EU= PUA(WA*(P)) + (1 -P)Un(Wn*(P)), 
U~(WA •(P)) = U~(Wn *(P)). 
Differentiating the above equations with respect to P and simplifying, 
Cook and Graham get 
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Substituting (30) into (31) yields 
(32) 8W/8P = -(W0 * - W)/P + (UA(WA*) - U0 (W0 *))/(U~(W0 *)), 
which bears a close resemblance to the value of human life derived in the 
last section (see Equation (20) ). As expected, this value or slope is directly 
related to the utility of living UA (WA*); however in this model, contrary 
to Usher's and Conley's, UA (WA*) represents the utility of life with wealth 
WA• and not simply the utility of wealth. Again, for the purpose of 
providing a theoretical basis for quantifying willingness to pay for 
mortality risk reduction, this distinction is critical. 
Finally, it is possible to establish a relationship between the pure 
protection benefit of the commodity and the individual's purchase of 
fair insurance. Cook and Graham have shown above that for the case 
of the replaceable commodity the opportunity to purchase insurance 
at fair odds implies that UA = U8 ; thus for a replaceable commodity it 
follows from (31) that -(W8 • - WA*) represents the pure protection 
benefit, which is identical to the ransom value R (WA*). The price appro-
priate for calculating the value of reducing the probability of losing a 
replaceable commodity can thus be inferred directly from knowledge 
of the amount of insurance that the individual would purchase at fair 
odds. 
Alternatively, in the case of an irreplaceable commodity, where 
UA > U8 , the appropriate value cannot be inferred from insurance pro-
tection purchases. In fact, the authors show that for an irreplaceable 
commodity the pure protection benefit implies a value for its loss which 
is bracketed by the amount the owner is willing to pay to avoid its loss 
R (W) and the amount of money required to fully compensate him for 
its loss C (W). Given the assumptions of this analysis, the implied value 
of a person's life would be bracketed by the amount of his budget and 
the "infinite" amount required to fully compensate him for accepting 
certain, immediate death. Insofar as his budget constraint is interpreted 
as being the present value of his expected earnings, the human-capital 
approach to life valuation reflects only a lower bound to the value of 
human life . 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The conclusion of this review is that there are no theoretical grounds 
for establishing an empirically useful relationship between the value, 
in the form of Hicksian compensating variations in wealth, of current 
period changes in a person's risk of death and his lifetime earnings. The 
significance of this conclusion to the cost-benefit analyst is that there 
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is no testable relationship between the willingness-to-pay and the human-
capital approaches to placing a value on the loss of a human life. 
The modelling work in this area has resulted in important insights 
with respect to a person's response to changes in his survival chances 
and his lifetime earnings, his possibilities for bequeathing his wealth 
and his insurance options; however, it has not provided the analyst with 
a theoretical basis for effectively quantifying personal demand for 
mortality risk reduction . Usher, who was the first to introduce uncertain 
mortality into a model of consumer choice, assumed that the consumer 
has both knowledge of and control over his survival probability. Conley 
took a slightly different approach by introducing behavioral variables. 
Both models generate a number of interesting results regarding a person's 
tradeoff of lifetime consumption for increased survival chances, includ-
ing the finding with which we have been most concerned - namely, that 
this tradeoff is a quantifiable function of lifetime consumption . However, 
we have shown in this review that this important result follows from 
the assumption that lifetime utility is equivalent to the utility of lifetime 
consumption. 
If we assume instead that the utility of lifetime consumption serves 
only as a lower bound to a person's utility of living, then we can conclude 
only that a person's lifetime earnings serve as a lower bound to his 
willingness to pay for a decreased chance of premature death. This is a 
conclusion of the Jones-Lee and of the Cook and Graham models, each 
of which adopts the less restrictive state-preference formulation of 
lifetime utility . According to the state-preference approach lifetime 
utility is a function of wealth conditional upon the states "alive" and 
"dead." A utility associated with the state of being dead requires the 
introduction of a bequest motive into their analyses. In addition, Cook 
and Graham introduce a unique definition of the value of life, which 
they refer to as the value of collective protection, requiring the existence 
of fair insurance. They conclude, however, that knowledge of the amount 
of insurance an individual purchases to insure himself against the loss 
of an irreplaceable commodity, such as his life, cannot lead to the 
calculation of the price appropriate for valuing the reduction of the 
probability of its loss. 
Unfortunately, it appears that there are limited possibilities to provide 
policy makers with meaningful data on personal willingness to pay for 
reduced mortality risk, regardless of whether these data are obtained 
from market behavior, from questionnaires or indirectly from personal 
lifetime earnings. Mishan is correct in reminding us that it is better to 
proceed with "rough estimates of the precise concept than precise 
estimates of economically irrelevant concepts," 17 but it is important for 
17. Mishan { 1971 ); p. 693 . 
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the analyst to recognize that life value estimates are rough. For this 
reason, cost-benefit calculations, especially in the area of public health 
and safety, should continue to be regarded as only an aid to the public 
decision process . 
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